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SELF-DEFENCE AND TERRORISM
Paul Cliteur*
This Chapter sets out to analyse the dangers threatening international peace
in the new, post-ideological age that began in 1989. With the Fall of the
Berlin Wall, expectations that major ideological conflict would be a thing of
the past seemed justified. The man who succeeded in defining this mood
most pithily was the American political analyst Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama
argued in 1989 that since liberalism had won the great ideological battle
against communism and fascism, this would result in a world where bore-
dom reigned.
What Fukuyama failed to appreciate, however, was that in this very same
year a death sentence was issued against a Western writer, Salman Rushdie,
which gave us an insight into a brand new kind of threat to the Western
world: radical Islam.
Later, radical Islam was to manifest itself in the attacks in the United
States on 11 September 2001, the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the
attacks in the London underground on 7 July 2005, the murder of the writer
Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, and, more recently, in the calls for the
murder of the cartoonists who had depicted the Prophet Muhammad by the
Jamaat-e-Islami party from Pakistan, among others.
Some people believe that we are witnessing a divide between the ideol-
ogy of the West, led by the United States, and at least a part of the Islamic
world. Others believe that this is a tendentious representation of the facts,
which may even be dangerous as a 'self-fulfilling prophesy'.
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This conflict raises countless questions. First: how should we define it? Is
it a 'Clash ofCivilizations' , to use Samuel Huntington's well-Imown phrase?1
Is it a 'religious' divide (or is it unrelated to religion)? Is it a problem that we
should take seriously (or would it be better not to pay too much attention to
it)? The most important question, however, is the following: can the problem
be solved?
The justification for raising this problem in a book on 'self-defence' is
that on both sides - the Western world as well as the Islamic world - people
characterize their own response as a form of 'self-defence'. Both parties be-
lieve that they actually respond to the other's aggression. As far as that is
concerned, the National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica of
20 September 20022 is not different from Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa in
which he rejects Rushdie's The Satanic Verses.3 The Americans claim the
right to defend themselves against attacks by religiously motivated interna-
tional terrorists by means of 'pre-emptive strikes'. Radical Muslims4 in Is-
lamic cOlmtries and in the West - or at least some of them - view cartoons
(Jyllands Posten), films (Submission) and novels (Satanic Verses) that are
insulting (or that they regard as insulting) to the Prophet or Islam as an un-
justified attack to which they must respond, if necessary by using force.
Because the right of self-defence is an important ground recognized in
international law for ignoring the prohibition against the use of force, this
may well give rise to further conflict, and in the most pessimistic scenario,
pose a threat to world peace.
What should happen? Following Roger Scmton and - in part - Frands
Fukuyama, it is argued in this Chapter that the situation is serious and, in all
I Huntington, Samuel, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993,
pp. 22-49; Huntington, Samuel, The Clash ojCivilizations and the Remaking ojWorld Ordel;
Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.
2 http://www.whitehouse.gov.lnsc/nss/html.
3 Included in Pipes, Daniel, The Rushdie Affail: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West,
Second Edition with a postscript by Koenraad Elst, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick
(USA) and London (UK) 2003, p. 27.
4 I will refer to Islamic believers who take the view that the use of violence, for example,
in response to cartoons about holy figures in Islam is permitted as 'radical Muslims', 'Muslim
terrorists', 'Islamists' or 'supporters ofpolitical Islam'. In this way I hope to make it clear that
I am not generalising about 'all Muslims' or about 'Islam as a whole'. I will not deal with the
relationship between political Islam and 'ordinary Islam'. For the purposes of this Chapter, it
is sufficient to note that certain people legitimize violence by invoking their religion. I will
not address the question ofwhether they are right in doing so.
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likelihood, insoluble in the short term. Perhaps we should not rule out that
we are entering a phase that could last as long as the Cold War.s During this
phase, two world views will be opposed to each other: that of the West and
that ofreligious fundamentalism. In this process - as the French Islam expert
Gilles Kepel has pointed out - either Europe will get Islamized or Islam will
get Europeanized.6
Fortunately, there are signs suggesting that the latter may happen. This
means the rise ofliberal Islam (or European Islam).7 Even so, we should not
be blind to the fact that religious fundamentalism is gaining ground. And that
means that the Western liberal democracies are no longer threatened by secular
political ideologies such as communism and Nazism (as Fukuyama rightly
pointed out), but by religious fundamentalism (to which Fukuyama paid too
little attention).8
Due to its universalist nature (Islamic law prevails over democratic legis-
lation) and its claim to absolute filth, religious fundamentalism is essen-
tially incompatible with the principles ofa liberal constitutional order. In the
years to come, Western democratic states under the rule of law will have to
do their utmost to develop a strong national identity that is acceptable to all
citizens and is perceived as the primary focus ofloyalty. In this context, it is
particularly important to strengthen the principle of territorial jurisdiction.
This, however, presupposes building on national identity and the integration
of religious minorities in secular democracies. It is not easy to say how this
should be done. It is possible, however, to say one thing that has received
insufficient attention for a long time: religion, in particular religion in its
fundamentalist form, is a factor that impedes the development of national
identity and state formation. Authors such as Francis Fukuyama and Fareed
5 For a pessimistic opinion, see Dalrymple, Theodore, 'When Islam breaks down', (2004),
in Theodore Dairymple, Dur Culture, What sLeft ofIt, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago 2005, pp. 283-
296, p. 295: 'To be sure, fundamentalist Islam will be very dangerous for some time to come,
and all of us, after all, live only in the short term; but ultimately the fate of the Church of
England awaits it.'
6 Kepel, GiIles, Fitna. Guerre au coeur de l'islam, Gallimard, Paris 2004; Kepel, Gilles,
Jihad. Expansion et declin de I'islamisme, Gallimard, Paris 2000.
7 This is advocated, inter alia, by Tibi, Bassam, 11/1 Schatten Allahs. Der Islam und die
Menschenrechte, UIlstein, Diisseldorf 2003.
8 And which Huntington understood better. A radical approach to this perspective is to be
found in Harris, Sam, The End ofFaith. Religion, Terror, and the Future ofReason, The Free
Press, London 2005.
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Zakaria do not pay sufficient attention to this point.9 For this reason, it would
be a good thing if religion became more of a private matter (laicite) rather
than a part ofthe nation's public morality (as rightly argued by Roger Scruton
and, by implication, by Todorov). There are no signs, however, suggesting
that this will be the case within the foreseeable future (as Sam Harris en
Theodore Dalrymple rightly argue).
1. FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY IN 1989
In 1989, a neoconservative magazine, The National Interest, published an
article by the American political analyst Francis Fukuyama. The title was
The End ofHistory. Fukuyama's main thesis was that in his lifetime liberal
democracy had defeated all its enemies (communism, fascism, socialism).
We were living in a new age. This age witnessed the triumph ofthe West, of
the Western idea. All the systematic alternatives to Western liberalism had
been defeated. What we were witnessing was not only the end of the Cold
War, but the end ofhistory as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideo-
logical evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government. 'The state that emerges at the end of
history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system oflaw
man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only
with the consent of the governed."o
Right at the end of his essay, there is a telling sentence, however, that
shows that Fukuyama was slightly uneasy about something. It is not too
difficult to imagine this uneasiness. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution over-
threw the reign of the Shah and installed an Islamic government. What did
Fukuyama have to say about that? In a famous sentence he implicitly refers
to it as follows: 'Our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to
liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only
those that are embodied in important social or political movements, and which
9 Zakaria, Fareed, 'The Islamic Exception', in Fareed Zakaria, The Future ofFreedom.
Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, W.w. Norton & Company, New York, London
2003, pp. 119-159.
10 Fukuyama, Francis, 'The End of History?', in The National Interest, No. 16, Summer
1989, pp. 3-18, and in Paul Schumalcer, Dwight C. Kiel, Thomas W. Heilke, eds., Ideological
Voices. An Anthology in Modem Political Ideas, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New
York etc. 1997, pp. 409-417, p. 411.
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are therefore part ofworld history. ,11 Fukuyama also explains his statement.
He says that for our purposes, 'it matters very little what strange thoughts
occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso, for we are interested in what one
could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of mankind.' 12
These are strange examples. Nobody was talking about Albania. And no-
body would claim that Burkina Faso posed a threat to the United States of
America and its Western allies. Why does Fukuyama not say more about this
'crackpot messiah'? By using the word 'messiah', Fukuyama seems to indi-
cate that he has a person with religious authority in mind, but by adding the
word' crackpot', he also suggests that he does not take this spiritual author-
ity seriously at all.
Back in 1989 this was not very strange. International terrorism, Bin Laden,
Al-Qaeda: these were matters insiders concerned themselves with. It is true
that the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, but this was considered for
the most part a relatively isolated event. This is why it is understandable up
to a certain point that Fukuyama failed to appreciate the importance of reli-
gion as a factor ofpolitical tensions.
This failure to appreciate the significance of religion may also be related
to secularisation. Charles Seelengut described in detail how Western, secu-
larized intellectuals have developed a blind spot for the influence of reli-
gion. 13 In the Western world, religion has been privatized to a great extent.
Many Westerners do not base their morality exclusively on their religion, but
have come to regard this as such a matter of course that they forget that this
is quite different in other parts of the world and in other cultures. In other
parts of the world, secularisation has not progressed as much as in the West.
Some people are of the opinion that it is even non-existent in the Islamic
world.
In 1991, the philosopher and cultural anthropologist Ernest Gellner shocked
many by putting this as follows. 'I think it is fair to say that no secularisation
11 Fukuyama, supra, fu 10, p. 413.
12 Idem.
13 On this subject, see Seelengut, Charles, Sacred FUly. Understanding Religious Vio-
lence, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Walnut Creek, Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford
2003. A similar point was made in Nelson-Pallmeyer, Jack, Is Religion Killing Us? Violence
in the Bible and the Quran, Trinity Press International, Rarrisburg 2003; Rohrlich, Wilfried,
Die Macht derReligionen. GlaubenskonfIikte in der Weltpolitik, Verlag C.R. Beck, Miinchen
2004; Haught, James, Holy Hatred. Religious Conflicts of the '90s, Prometheus Books,
Amherst, New York 1995.
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has taken place in the world ofIslam: that the hold ofIslam over its believers
is as strong, and in some ways stronger, now than it was 100 years ago.
Somehow or other, Islam is secularisation-resistant, and the very striking
thing is that this remains tme under a whole range of political regimes.' 14
Three years later Gellner repeated this point when he said that, compared
to other world religions, Islam was different in this respect. IS For all world
religions, it is tme that the gradual process of industrialisation that many
societies have gone through has weakened the position of religion. This
secularisation thesis is roughly correct: 'It would be difficult to deny the
overall trend towards secularisation', writes Gellner. But the position of Is-
lam is an exception to that. The position of Islam has not weakened in the
past one hundred years; on the contrary, one may even claim that its position
has become stronger.
The hold ofIslam over the populations ofthe lands in which it is the main
religion has in no way diminished in the course of the last hundred years. In
some ways it has been markedly strengthened. 16
The American Arabist Bemard Lewis has made similar observations. 17
It was a long time before scholars began to recognize the correctness of
this view and many have still not done so. Many still consider it more or less
a matter of course that Islam will go through (or has ah"eady gone through)
the same development as Christianity. This means a development of increas-
ing liberalism, a development towards ever increasing secularisation. 18 This
explains why Fukuyama was still able to believe in 1989 that with the disap-
pearance of the classical ideologies, the most important cause of tensions
between the states on the world stage would disappear too. The latter has
proved to be a serious flaw in his analysis. Fukuyama's essay ended with a
curious passage. After the writer had sung the praises of the triumph of lib-
eral democracy and liberalism, he predicted that the new era without ideolo-
gies that we were about to enter would be a sad time:
14 Gellner, Emest, 'Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons', in International Affairs,
Vo!. 67, No. 1, January 1991, pp. 1-6, p. 2.
15 Gellner, Emest, Conditions ofLiberty. Civil Society and Its Rivals, Hamish Hamilton,
London 1994, p. 15.
16 Gellner, Ibid., p. 15.
17 Lewis, Bemard, 'The Return ofIslam', in Commentmy, January 1976, pp. 39-49, re-
vised and recast in Lewis, Bemard, Islam and the West, Oxford University Press, New York,
Oxford 1993, pp. 133-155.
18 In a way, this is also the position taken by Sorman, Guy, Les Enfants de Rifaa. Musulmans
et modemes, Fayard, Paris 2003.
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'The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the
willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological
struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be re-
placed by economic calculation, the endless solving oftechnical problems, envi-
ronmental concerns, and the satisfaction ofsophisticated consumer demands. In
the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the per-
petual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel myself, and see in
others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. Such
nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-
historical world for some time to come. I have the most ambivalent feelings for
the civilisation that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic
and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the
end of history will serve to get history started again.' 19
This is an interesting passage that includes - partly unintended perhaps -
some elements that were later found to be correct but also some elements
that show that Fukuyama was wide of the mark.
2. CRITICISM OF FUKUYAMA
Let us start with the latter point. It will have escaped nobody's attention that
these 'centuries of boredom at the end of history' have turned out quite dif-
ferent from what Fukuyama expected and predicted. Ideological tensions in
the world have run high. But are these in any way related to ideology?
Fukuyama would undoubtedly object. That depends on how one defines 'ide-
ology'. One thing is clear: these are not the familiar ideologies we associate
with the 1930s or those that manifested themselves in the battle of ideas
during the Cold War. But that does not mean that nowadays people no longer
devote their heart and soul to specific views for which they are prepared to
literally go through fire and water. It is certainly ironic that Fukuyama refers
to the unwillingness to 'risk one's life for a purely abstract goal'. What the
new world ofinternational religious terrorism has confronted us with is people
who are pre-eminently willing to risk their lives for abstract goals. Present-
day suicide terrorism is characterised by immense willingness to sacrifice.
This willingness to sacrifice is greater than anything we have witnessed in
19 See Fukuyama, supra, fn. 10, p. 417.
74 PAUL CLITEUR
previous centuries.2° This is what makes terrorism so difficult to grasp: all
classical functions ofcriminal law and all classical theories about deterrence
in international traffic fail to have any effect on religious terrorists.
As is well-known, we have undergone many traumatic experiences with
religion as a factor in social tension and strife in Europe. In the 16th and 17th
centuries, Europe was the scene ofbattle during the conflicts between Catho-
lics and Protestants, a battle that was pacified with the rise ofnational states
and the development of such principles as freedom of conscience, freedom
of religion and freedom of speech. It is not inconceivable, however, that a
new social contract of this kind will again have to be sought.
The 1990s were characterised by what has been called 'The Return ofthe
Sacred' or 'La Revanche de Dieu' (Gilles Kepel), and in particular, as men-
tioned above, 'The Return of Islam'.21 The challenge facing Western de-
mocracies in the years to come is to integrate religion into the liberal
constitutional order.
3. DOES POLITICAL ISLAM POSE A THREAT TO THE WEST?
As we have seen, Fukuyama devoted hardly any attention to religion in 1989.
As a matter of fact, this has not changed subsequently, which may explain
why Fukuyama has paid so little attention to political Islam. He considers
political Islam a movement that will not pose a challenge to the West, be-
cause political Islam is probably not a viable alternative to liberalism. So-
cialism and fascism were such alternatives. Fukuyama himselfmakes it clear
that he is concerned with challenges to liberalism that manifest themselves
'in important social or political movements, and which are therefore part of
world history. ,22 Does political Islam satisfy this criterion? Fulcuyama thinks
not. This was his view not only in 1989 but also in 2004. In that year, he
wrote: 'AI-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups aspire to be existential
threats to American civilisation but do not currently have anything like the
20 See Cook, David, 'The Implications of 'Martyrdom Operations' For Contemporary
Islam', in Journal a/Religious Ethics, 2004 (32), pp. 129-151; Cook, David, Understanding
Jihad, University ofCalifomia Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2005; Broom, Mia,
Dying to Kill. The Allure of Suicide Terror, Columbia University Press, New York 2005.
21 See Lewis, Bemard, supra, fn. 17, pp. 133-155.
22 See Fukuyama, supra, fn. 10, p. 413.
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capacity to actualize their vision: They are extremely dangerous totalitar-
ians, but pose threats primarily to regimes in the Middle East. ,23
The theory Fukuyama presents here is frequently advocated by those who
point out that Islamic fundamentalism actually testifies to the failure ofpo-
litical Islam rather than its success. Nowhere - except in Iran - have the
political Islamists been able to install Islamic theocracies. This has exasper-
ated the Islamists so much that they resort to violence. This violence takes
the form ofterrorism, but this terrorism does not show the power ofpolitical
Islam, but its impotence. Fukuyama defines this theory as follows: 'The glo-
bal Nazi and communist threats were existential both because their banner
was carried by a great power, and because ideologically there were many
people in the United States and throughout the Western world seduced by
their vision. The Islamist threat has no such appeal (...)' .24
To be sure, communism and fascism represent a kind of threat to Western
states that is different from the threat posed by Islamism. For example, Is-
lamic states like Iran do not constitute a threat to the hated United States in
the sense that tensions could result in a classical fonn of warfare that is po-
tentially threatening to the United States. As Sadik AI-Azm puts it: the Is-
lamic states are not in the same league as the West.25 But those who are 'not
in the same league' in the traditional sense of the word may still constitute a
considerable threat in an entirely new sense.
Fukuyama thinks too much in the classical terms ofdanger and threat and
perhaps also too much in terms oflarge numbers, because it may be true that
the radicalism ofpolitical Islam is able to mobilize only few people in terms
of quantity, but it seems that this small number of supporters is amply com-
pensated by the fanaticism of the few who are inspired by it. The words
spoken in this context by the American Arabist Bernard Lewis seem to be
more sensible: 'Terrorism requires only a few. Obviously, the West must
defend itself by whatever means will be effective. But in devising means to
fight the terrorists, it would surely be useful to understand the forces that
drive them. ,26 This is a penetrating observation: 'Terrorism requires only a
few'.
23 Fukuyama, Francis, 'The Neoconservative Moment', in National Interest, July 1,2004.
24 See Fukuyama, supra, fn. 10, p. 413.
25 On the occasion of the presentation of the Erasmus Prize. Here quoted in: Ede Botje,
Harm, 'De voorgangers van Van Gogh', in Vi-V Nederland, 27 November 2004.
26 Lewis, The Crisis ofIslam, p. xxviii.
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Incidentally, the flawed nature of Fukuyama's analysis relating to politi-
cal Islam is also shown by the continuation of the passage quoted above.
After Fukuyama has said 'the Islamist threat has no such appeal', he contin-
ues as follows: 'except perhaps in countries like France that have permitted
high levels of immigration from Muslim countries.'
This is not an unimportant addition. After 11 September, after the murder
ofTheo van Gogh, after many other incidents, such as the attacks in London,
which involved religiously motivated terrorists, this seems to be the conces-
sion to the power ofreligion Fukuyama is prepared to make. At this junchlre,
in 2004, he indicated that his optimistic assessment ofthe danger ofIslamism
was based on immigration figures and demographic relations in the United
States. But in European countries, such as France - countries with a consid-
erable Muslim population - this 'may be different'.
Accordingly, it seems perfectly justified to give some further thought to
the challenge posed by political Islam to the Western countries - even on the
basis of what Fukuyama himselfwrites about it.
4. RUSHDIE'S DEATH SENTENCE
The year 1989 saw not only the publication of Fukuyama's article and the
Fall of the Berlin Wall, which had defined the ideological differences be-
tween the East and the West since the end ofthe Second World War, but also
the emergence ofa new actor on the stage ofworld history. This was the very
'crackpot messiah' about whom Fukuyama had spoken in such slighting but
also soothing terms. One of the most striking letters in recent political his-
tory written by one head of state to another was sent in that very year of
1989. The letter was sent by Ayatollah Khomeini to Michael Gorbachev. In
this letter ofJanuary 1989, Khomeini commented on the failure ofMarxism
('henceforth communism should be found in the museums ofworld political
history'). That should not drive Gorbachev in the hands of liberalism,
Khomeini argued. He should not look to the West for spiritual renewal, but to
the South. 'I strongly urge that in breaking down the walls ofMarxist fanta-
sies, you do not fall into the prison of the West and the Great Satan', the
Iranian leader wrote to his disillusioned colleague. 'I call upon you seriously
to study and conduct research into Islam (... ). I openly announce that the
Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and most powerful base of the
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Islamic world, can easily help fill up the ideological vacuum of your sys-
tern. ,27
This letter breathes enormous self-confidence, which is also expressed in
the pretensions of the fatwa Khomeini issued against Rushdie. Since 1570,
when Pope Pius V issued the bull Regnans in excelsis, in which he called on
the population to resist the British Queen Elizabeth I, no spiritual leader had
addressed the British secular authorities in this manner. The pretensions of
this kind offatwa are far-reaching, as we are gradually beginning to realise.
How can an Iranian spiritual leader claim jurisdiction over a British writer?
In a way, this is related to the specific nature of Islam, but also to the
conditions under which we live nowadays. This specific nature ofIslam means
that Muslims believe in the revealed Word of God, whose Will has been
written in a Holy Book, which prescribes rules of life that may under no
circumstances be violated.
Of course, this was not a new theory. It is not even a theory that needs to
result in insuperable problems under conditions other than those under which
we live today. Khomeini's theory, for example, would not be too great a
problem in a homogeneous society in which people sharing the territory of
the state believe in one and the same god. That is no longer the case, how-
ever, in the world in which we live. We live in a globalising world, in which
people with the most different religious views live more-or-less next to each
other. This 'living next to each other' may actually mean living physically
next to each other, but it may also concern a situation in which the modern
means of communication inform us about what happens in other parts ofthe
world at amazing speed. It is a cliche, but the world has become smaller.
Anyone who publishes a book in Britain may deeply insult a person in Iran
or Pakistan with it (as actually happened with Rushdie's book). In the new
global world, everybody feels 'vulnerable'. Everybody is aware that he or
she is directly confronted with a world that remained hidden from him or her
in the past or about which it was extremely difficult to gain any knowledge.
This vulnerability means that people feel that they have to 'defend' them-
selves. And the act of defending oneselfmay be accompanied by 'force' .
Terrorist violence manifests itself in two ways. First of all, in the attacks
in London, Madrid and the United States ofAmerica, a group of terrorists
place a bomb on an underground train, in a train station or another place
27 Quoted in Pipes, Daniel, supra, fn. 3, p. 192.
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where many people are gathered. The victims are random strangers, or at
least their only involvement in the 'conflict' is that they are part of the cul-
ture that is rejected by pious believers or that they have tolerated the wrong
government (in democracies nobody is innocent, terrorists tend to say, be-
cause the citizens in a democracy tolerate their governments). A second lond
of attack is the targeted lolling of people the radicals accuse of insulting
Islam. Examples of the latter include the fatwa against Rushdie, the murder
ofDr. Farag Foda on 8 June 1992, the attack on Egypt's Nobellaureate writer
Naguib Mahfuz, who 'was stabbed in order to silence and intimidate outspo-
ken critics of fundamentalists' in 1994,28 the murder ofTheo van Gogh on 2
November 200429 because he had insulted the Prophet, and the calls for the
killing ofcartoonists who satirised the Prophet Muhammad in Februmy 2006.
With the murder ofTheo van Gogh, a new chapter in the history ofpoliti-
cal-religious terrorism on European soil was written. Before the murder of
Van Gogh, religious terrorism had been confIned to collective attacks. With
the murder ofvan Gogh, the practice ofmurdering individuals, such as Farag
Foda in Egypt, had come to Europe.
Present-day religious terrorism is different from traditional terrorism in
yet another respect: the use ofviolence against people because oftheir ideo-
logical views or the opinions they express. Pim Fortuyn had become a promi-
nent politician in the Netherlands, van Gogh was only a writer and fIlm-maker.
This means that the ambitions of modem religious terrorists are different
from those of the terrorists of the past. They attempt to hit Western societies
in the heart of their existence. This heart is the free discussion of political
views, scientifIc views and religious views.
The latest conflict is relatively recent and, by way ofillustration, it will be
dealt with in somewhat greater detai1.3o
5. THE DANISH CARTOON AFFAIR
In September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands Pasten published a se-
ries of 12 cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad, which triggered a great
28 Esposito, John L., Unholy Wm: Terror in the Name ofIslam, Oxford University Press,
New York 2002, p. 92.
29 See Jansen, Johannes, The Dual Nature ofIslamic Fundamentalism, Comell Univer-
sity Press, Ithaca, New York 1997, p. 113.
30 See 'Woede over cartoons raast voort', in Ti'ouw, 1 February 2006.
SELF-DEFENCE AND TERRORISM 79
many protests, death threats, mass demonstrations, and diplomatic boycotts.
Initially, only Danish Muslims were angry about the cartoons, but after some
time it escalated into an international row.
For example, when the interior ministers of the Arab League gathered in
Tunis on 31 January 2006, they opened the attack on what they perceived as
the Western principle of freedom of speech and requested the Danish Gov-
ernment to punish the relevant cartoonists 'severely'.
On 31 January 2006, the editorial office ofJyllands Pasten inAarhus was
evacuated following a bomb alert. The Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami offered a
reward of 8000 dollars to anyone who managed to murder one of the car-
toonists. This meant that once again a reward was offered for murdering
people because of their views. This time it did not concern views expressed
in a novel but views expressed in cartoons.
Throughout the world, there was a storm of protest against the cartoons,
and supporters and opponents were at each other's throats, which claimed
several victims.
In this respect, there seems to be a contrast between the predominant opin-
ion in the Western world and the predominant opinion in Islamic countries.
Muslims - and perhaps not just radical Muslims - think that insulting the
Prophet constitutes an absolute limit to what can be tolerated in the name of
the freedom ofspeech. The writer Theo van Gogh was killed because he had
insulted the Prophet. Of course, many Muslims reject this kind of murder,
but the cartoon affair shows that insulting the Prophet is a very sensitive
issue in the Islamic world, and not just among religious fanatics.
It is often said that the issue should be resolved by considering each other's
sensitivity, by refraining from hurting each other's feelings. In fact, the Dan-
ish cartoons affair is a repeat of the Rushdie affair. The Iranians could not
understand in 1989 why the British Government did not take disciplinary
action against the writer Rushdie, who had insulted the Prophet in his book
The Satanic Verses. The British had made it clear that they were not happy
with the book either, had they not? The British made it clear that they did not
want to insult Muslims. Why was the book not banned? Why was the book
not withdrawn from the market?
These are obvious demands from the perspective of a dictatorial regime.
Any failure to meet these demands cannot but be regarded as hypocrisy on .
the part of the Western states.
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When viewed from a Western perspective, on the other hand, it is virtu-
ally impossible to punish a writer for what the characters in his novel say.
There are similar problems when it comes to prohibiting cartoons. Any artist
faced with a statutory ban against making cartoons could challenge this stat-
ute immediately on account ofits inconsistency with the Constitution or with
a provision from one of the human rights conventions.
In addition, it is virtually impossible for any government in a Western
state under the rule of law, to control all manifestations the new means of
communication allow (the Internet, for example). This means that those who
want to prohibit cartoons and novels place high demands from a legal per-
spective and their demands are also technically impossible. It may sound far-
fetched, but it seems justified to conclude that prohibiting simple cartoons or
novels would require a Western open society to transform itself into a dicta-
torship.
It does not seem to be overly pessimistic to claim that there is a funda-
mentalclash between the predominant opinion in the Western world and the
predominant opinion in Islamic states in relation to matters such as freedom
of speech, freedom of religion,31 equality before the law between men and
women, and sexual freedom.32 In all likelihood, this clash will continue to
be a source ofconflicts33 between population groups sharing territory in one
and the same state, but also between states and, above all, between terrorist
and fundamentalist religious groups on the one hand and Western states on
the other, whereby terrorists will use the ultimate instrument (murder) to
destabilize and intimidate Western societies.
We should not forget that many of the attacks committed by religious
terrorists are connected with what may well be regarded from the Western
perspective as the core principle ofWestern freedom: the freedom of speech
and the freedom of religion.34 When viewed from the Islamic perspective,
3 J See Warraq, Ibn, ed., Leaving Islam. Apostates Speak Out, Prometheus Books, Amherst,
New York, 2003.
32 Howland, Courtney, ed., Religious Fundamentalism and the Human Rights ofWomen,
Palgrave, New York 2001.
33 On the introduction ofparts ofSharia in Western legal systems, among other issues, see
Marshall, Paul, ed., Radical Islam sRules. The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari 'a Law,
Rowman & Littlefied Publishers, Inc., Lanham etc. 2005.
34 The basis for the other fundamental rights. On this subject, see Jellinek, George, Die
Erkliirung del' Menschen- undBiirgerrechte, Vierte Auflage, in DritterAuflage bearbeitet von
Waiter Jellinek, Duncker & Humblot, Miinchen u,nd Leipzig 1927.
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these attacks are connected with the holiest of the holiest: God and the
Prophet.
6. THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALISATION SHARPENS THE
DIFFERENCES
Naturally, the question to be addressed is whether we are facing a problem of
radical Islam,35 Islam,36 monotheism,37 religion, or fanaticism?38 It lies
outside the scope of this Chapter to deal with this question, but the point we
can make is that conflicts that did not exist or were only of local significance
in the past have a much greater impact in this day and age. This was already
shown by the conflict about the publication ofRushdie's The Satanic Verses,
but is also clear from the Danish cartoons affair. It was aPaldstani organisation
that offered a reward for the murder of cartoonists in Denmark. It was Iraqi
terrorists. who took French tourists hostage because they wanted to exert
influence on French legislation.39 After the Dutch Member of Parliament
Hirsi Ali had made some remarks about the Prophet Muhammad, representa-
tives ofthe international Organisation ofIslamic Conference reported to the
Chairman ofthe parliamentary party ofthe Dutch Liberals (VVD) in order to
complain about the discourteous treatment ofthe Prophet by a Liberal Mem-
ber ofParliament.4o A Danish imam infonnedAl-Jazeera about the cartoons
3S This is the opinion of Tibi, Bassam, Del' neue Totalitarismus. Heiliger Krieg und
westliche Sicherheit, Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 2004.
36 This is the opinion ofSpencer, Robert, Islam Unveiled. Disturbing Questions About the
World's Fastest-Growing Faith, Encounter Books, San Francisco 2002; Spencer, Robert, On-
ward Muslim Soldiers. How Jihad Still Threatens America and the West, Regnery Publishing,
Inc., Washington 2003; Raddatz, Hans-Peter, Allahs Frauen. Djihad zwischen Scharia und
Demokratie, Herbig, Mlinchen 2005.
37 Kirsch, Jonathan, God against the Gods. The History of the War between Monotheism
and Polytheism, Viking Compass, New York 2004.
38 As is argued by Laqueur, Waiter, Krieg dem Westen. Terrorismus im 21. Jahrhundert,
PropyHien, Mlinchen 2003.
39 'Headscarf, the reason for kidnapping', in De Telegraaf, 30 August 2004: In August
2004, two French journalists were kidnapped by Iraq Muslim terrorists. The journalists in-
volved were Christian Chesnot from Radio France International and George Malbrunot from
Le Figaro. They were kidnapped by the Islamic Army, which killed the Italian journalist
Baldoni on 26 August 2004. The terrorists threatened to behead the journalists if France did
not immediately lift the headscarf ban in French schools.
40 On 26 February 2003, a letter was sent to the Chairman of the parliamentary party of
the VVD, Gerrit Zalm. The letter was sent by 21 members of an Islamic organisation known
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affair, as a result ofwhich the conflict took an international dimension. And
so on and so forth. In this context, globalisation presents an important prob-
lem: the national borders seem to crumble.
Because different parties rely on the concept of' self-defence' , it is impor-
tant to reflect on its nature, as it forms a second core concept ofthe argument
advanced in this Chapter.
7. THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DEFENCE
Self-defence is considered to be a umdamental principle of law. It is an in-
herent right that, according to the great Roman lawyer, philosopher and states-
man Cicero has the status of a natural law principle: 'There exists a law, not
written down anywhere but inborn in our hearts; a law that comes to us not
by training or reading but from nature itself (...) that if our lives are endan-
gered, any and every method ofprotecting ourselves is morally right. ,41
According to contemporary standards relating to rights and morals, this
formulation is much too broad. Numerous questions ofinterpretation present
themselves. Is it true that the right to self-defence is a natural law principle?
Is it really inborn in our hearts and not acquired by training? Is really every
method ofprotecting ourselves morally right if our lives are endangered? Or
should we even then restrain ourselves to proportional violence?
We can also fonnulate interesting questions regarding the interpretation
of the word 'lives'. 'If our lives are endangered, any and every method of
protecting ourselves is morally right. ' What does that mean? Is 'lives' only
our biological lives? That would mean that self-defence would not be al-
lowed if! am attacked for the purpose of being sold as a slave (it is not my
life that is in danger, but my freedom). Is self-defence possible only if my
own life is attacked or also the lives of my relatives, my friends and compa-
triots?
as the 'Organisation of the Islamic Conference' (OIC). The signatories of the letter com-
plained about the 'insulting comments made against the Prophet Muhammad by a newly
elected Member of Parliament, Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Aii' in the newspaper Trouw of25 January
2003. Hirsi Ali had called Muhammad a 'perverse man', because he was married to a nine-
year-old girl: Alsja.
41 The Second Amendment: America's First Freedom, by Charlton Heston, Fall 1999
Human Rights Magazine.
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And finally: who decides what is my 'self'? Can I define my 'self' as my
'honour', my ethnic and religious pride? And, most important, perhaps, can
I define my 'self' with reference to the Prophet, so that I am justified in
defending my 'self', when the Prophet is insulted?
On this particular point, there seems to be a great difference of opinion
between the Western world on the one hand and some parts of Islamic cul-
ture on the other, as the row over the Danish cartoons has demonstrated. In
Islamic culture there seems to be not only a different conception of 'self' , but
also a different conception of 'violence' and 'attack'. Self-defence is consid-
ered to be justified not only in the case of an armed attack on the physical
integrity ofthe state, but also when the Prophet's honour is violated or when
'Islam' is threatened by means of speech and even drawings.
In Luclmow, the capital of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, an Islamic
court issued a death sentence against the 12 cartoonists of the Danish
Muhammad cartoons on 20 February 2006. This also took the form of a
fatwa, a religious ruling. The religious head of the court, Maulana Mufti
Abul Irfan, declared: 'Death is the only sentence for the sacrilege of the
cartoons. ,42 Irfan claimed that the court's opinion was binding on all Mus-
lims, wherever they were.43
Some questions that can be posed in the footsteps ofCicero's formulation
of self-defence have been answered by courts dealing with cases in which
these questions were relevant.
As would be expected, self-defence has a place in national penal law, but
also in international law. According to the law of nations, the state is an
entity that is allowed to defend itself And what the state is allowed to defend
is its territorial integrity. Some writers infer this from the concept ofa sover-
eign state. 'A sovereign state is entitled to defend itself, that is, to protect its
territorial integrity. ,44 According to Wheaton, the right to self-preservation
is an absolute right, lying at the foundation of all the other rights of states.45
A state's right of self-defence is nowadays recognized in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inher-
42 'Iran, too, wants to soothe the cartoons affair', in: NRC Handelsblad, 21 January 2006.
43 'Islamic court in India issues death sentence to cartoonists', in Agence France Press,
20 February 2006.
44 Janis, Mark w., An Introduction to International Law, Second Edition, Little Brown
and Company, Boston etc. 1993, p. 179.
45 Cited in Janis, supra, fn. 44, p. 178.
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ent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member ofthe United Nations (...).' Concomitant with Artic1e 51 's
right to self-defence is Article 2(4) 's prohibition against 'the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.'
The classic definition of the right of self-defence in customary intema-
tionallaw was formulated in the Caroline case. As a result of this case, the
American Secretary of State laid down the essentials of self-defence that
made history. There had to exist 'a necessity of self-defence, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. ,46
The history of the case goes back to the middle of the 19th century. In
1837, the British tried to cmsh a rebellion in Upper Canada. The United
States was unwilling to antagonize the British by giving direct support to the
rebels, but did not prevent the formation ofprivate militias in New York. The
volunteers used a steamboat, the Caroline, to transport anns and men to the
rebel headquarters ofNavy Island, on the Canadian side ofthe Niagara River.
The British responded with a night raid. They captured the boat, as it docked
at Fort Schlosser, New York, set it on fire and sent it over Niagara Falls. Two
men were killed as they fled the steamer.47
The incident meant that the British had intervened on US territory. The
British justified their action by saying that the destruction of the Caroline
was an act of 'necessary self-defence'.
In 1842 the incident was discussed again when the two parties tried to
settle the case amicably. On this occasion, the American Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, presented his famous definition of self-defence. He con-
ceded that the use of self-defence could be justified in some circumstances.
He said:
'Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of
the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to
cases in which the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, leav-
ing no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation' .48
Webster added that nothing 'unreasonable or excessive' could be done in
self-defence. Since then these parameters ofcustomary intemationallaw have
46 Cited in Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, Third Edition, Grotius Publications,
England 1991, p. 692.
47 Byers, Michael, War Law. International Law and Armed Conflict, Atlantic Books, Lon-
don 2005, p. 53.
48 Cited in Byers, supra, fn. 47, p. 54.
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been accepted by other governments: 'necessity' and 'proportionality' were
the keywords. Force used in self-defence must be 'necessary' and 'propor-
tional' to the seriousness of the armed attack.49
Although much effort has been made to present a viable concept ofjusti-
fied self-defence, the content ofArticle 51 is very much rooted in customary
international law.50
First, there is the question of territory. The attack that gives rise to the
right of self-defence need not necessarily be directed against a state's terri-
tory. Article 6 ofthe North Atlantic Treaty 1949 provided for collective self-
defence against 'an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in
Europe or North America ( ), on the occupation forces ofany ofthe parties
in the North Atlantic area ( ) or on the vessels or aircrafts in this area ofany
of the parties' .51 In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Jus-
tice held that British warships under attack in foreign territorial waters were
entitled to return fire.
Another'question is whether the right to self-defence can be invoked when
a state's citizens are attacked. Can the right to self-defence also be invoked
when a state's nationals resident abroad are attacked? Most writers do not
think SO.52
There are also some important questions concerning the notion of 'armed
attack'. What is the precise extent of the right of self-defence? Can it be
resorted to only 'if an armed attack occurs' or also in other circumstances?
And what is 'anned attack'? The Comi noted that this includes not only
action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also other
activities similar to an armed attack.
8. CAN THE AMERICANS INVOKE SELF-DEFENCE IN THE WAR ON
TERROR?
Naturally, international law may adhere to a limited conception of self-de-
fence. In that case self-defence could be justified if
49 Nicaragua v USA, ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14,94 and pp, 122-123.
50 This is the opinion of Byers, see above, fn. 47, p. 56.
51 Akehurst, Michae1, A Modern Introduction to International Law, Sixth Edition, Harper
Collins Academic, London 1991 (1970), p. 264.
52 Idem.
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• a state (and not a group ofpeople);
• is physically attacked (i.e. by military means, not by words);
• by another state;
• and the Security Council has authorized this.
The United States were not attacked by a state, but by an organisation (Al-
Qaeda), perhaps backed by one or more states.53
About one year after 11 September 2001, the Bush administration pre-
sented a new national secmity plan: The National Secmity Strategy of the
United States ofAmerica (2002).54 The Bush administration does not deny
that the events of 9/11 were a major factor in its drafting. 'The events of
September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed the context for relations be-
tween the United States and other main centres of global power', the plan
states.55 And another passage reads: 'The major institutions of American
national security were designed in a different era to meet different require-
ments. All ofthem must be transfonned. ,56 It is hard to deny that the Ameri-
can administration presented a very controversial plan, but it cannot be denied
either that it is based on a consistent idea. In fact, the guiding ideas are men-
tioned in the introduction and are elaborated in the succeeding chapters. One
could characterize the plan or the memorandum on the basis of five pillars or
themes. The plan itself does not distinguish these very clearly, but it may
clarify matters to present it in this way.
First pillar: communism defeated. The first pillar of the plan comprises an
historical assertion, and one which is not particularly controversial. It means
that the world has fundamentally changed as a result of the disappearance of
the Soviet Union as a world power and the disappearance of communism as
the ideology that poses a challenge to the Western world. 'The great struggle
of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with the
victory of the forces of freedom', the Bush administration writes.57
53 See Franck, Thomas M., 'Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense', in The American
Journal ofInternational Law, Vo!. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 839-843, who criticizes the
grounds for the European condemnation of the US.
54 http://www.whitehouse.gov.lnsc/nss/html.
55 The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica, p. 28.
56 Ibid., p. 29.
57 Ibid., introduction.
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Second pillar: rejection of cultural relativism. The second policy pillar is
defined less explicitly and certainly not in the terms I will now use, yet it
constitutes an unmistakable element ofthe United States' new security strat-
egy and the underlying world view. This second pillar is the rejection of
cultural relativism.
Cultural relativism is the conviction that every culture has its own values
and standards that cannot be traced to another culture.58 Morality is always
local morality. Politics is always local politics. Any idea that there is such a
thing as universal morality, values and standards that apply to all people is an
illusion. The American policy memorandum rejects this cultural relativism
and argues in favour ofuniversality.
People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will gov-
ern them; worship as they please; and enjoy the fruits of their labour. These
values offreedom, the plan continues, are 'right and true for every person, in
every society' .59
In this' way the Bush administration does not comment on the time in
which we live (as with the first pillar), but it commits itselfto a philosophical
position. It embraces the universalist position of the natural-law doctrine or
ofuniversal morality. It rejects the principles of cultural relativism that indi-
cate that values and standards are a matter of local customs without any
claim to universality. A phrase that is sometimes used in this context is that
certain values 'are non-negotiable'. The strategy plan defines it as follows:
'America must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human dig-
nity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech;
fi'eedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic
tolerance and respect for property. ,60 In the same way that Cicero bases the
right of self-defence on a universal human nature, other values may be de-
rived from this human nature.61 The US also indicates that it wants to propa-
58 See Rachels, James, 'The challenge of cultural relativism', in The Elements ofMoral
Philosophy, Fourth edition, McGraw-Hill Inc., New York etc. 2003 (1986), pp. 61-31, p. 18/
19; Donnelly, Jack, 'Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights', in Human Rights
Quarterly, 6 (1984), pp. 400-419; Gensler, Harry, 'Cultural Relativism', in Ethics, Routledge,
London & New York 1998, pp. 11-20.
59 The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica, introduction.
60 Ibid., p. 3.
61 With respect to human nature as the basis for natural law, see Gardner, Martin, 'Beyond
Cultural Relativism', in Gardner, Martin, The Night is Large. Collected Essays 1938-1995,
Penguin Books, London 1996, pp. 149-161.
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gate these values across the world: 'the United States will use this moment of
opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. ,62
Third pillar: American supremacy. The third pillar is in fact the military-
strategic counterpart ofthe first pillar. The third pillar means that the United
States ofAmerica is the only superpower left. This position entails certain
obligations, the Americans argue.
Today, the United States enjoys a position ofunparalleled military strength
and great economic and political influence.63
Fourth pillar: all the same, the world has not become a saferplace. It could
be argued that the fourth observation is the most innovative. It is an idea
fostered by 9/11: in spite ofthe first three points, the world has not become a
safer place for Americans, or for others.
In this modern world, however, the threats to freedom are different from
those ofthe Cold War. The threats are no longer posed by large states, but by
'shadowy networks ofindividuals' that may cause considerable damage. These
networks 'can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores' for less than the
cost ofpurchasing asingle tank.64 The biggest threat, according to the Bush
administration, lies 'at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. ,65 For
example, the opponents ofthe US claim that they are attempting to develop
or have already developed weapons of mass destruction.
Another way ofputting it is as follows. The danger is no longer posed by
strong states but by weak states, because the latter states often provide the
space within which terrorist organisations can develop. What 11 September
2001 has taught us, the Bush administration writes, is 'that weak states, like
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong
states. ,66 'America', it writes, 'is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than
by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.,67
Incidentally, this part ofAmerican thinking about defence is broadly sup-
ported, even by some critics of American policy. For example, Fukuyama
writes: 'The fact is that the chief threats to us and to world order come today
62 The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica, introduction.
63 Ibid., introduction.
64 Idem.
65 Idem.
66 Idem.
67 Ibid., p. 1.
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from weak, collapsed, or failed states. (... ) Before 9/11 the United States felt
it could safely ignore chaos in a far-off place like Afghanistan; but the inter-
section of religious terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has meant
that formerly peripheral areas are now of central concern. ,68
The danger is also called 'terrorism'. According to the plan, the United
States of America 'is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The
enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The
enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against innocents. ,69 Poverty alone does not cause terrorism, the plan claims,
but poverty in combination with weak institutions, a corrupt state and terror-
ist networks constitutes a deadly danger.7o
Besides terrorism, the plan refers to 'rogue states' as a big threat to the
US.
Fifth pillar: The US must defend itself. So far the plan has not legitimized
regime change, humanitarian interventions or pre-emptive strikes in self-
defence. It is perfectly possible to take the view (a) that communism has
been defeated; (b) that the time has come in which all people, all over the
world, should be entitled to the same rights; (c) that US military supremacy
is firmly established and (d) that the world has not become a safer place in
spite ofthe earlier processes; it is possible to endorse all four points (in other
words, the first four pillars) and still maintain that the United States does not
have the right to preserve order in the world as the unipolar71 superpower or
take defensive action against foreign attacks without the explicit support of
the Security Council of the United Nations.72
68 Fukuyama, Francis, 'Nation-building', in The Atlantic Monthly, 293 (1), pp. 159-162.
See also Fukuyama, Francis, State-Building. Governance and World Order in the Twenty-
First Century, Profile Books, London 2004, preface.
69 The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica, p. 5.
70 This idea is also expressed in Pipes, Daniel, 'God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause
Militant Islam?', in National Interest, Winter 2002, and also at www.danielpipes.org/article/
104.
71 This term was introduced by Charles Krautharnmer. See Krauthammer, Charles, Demo-
cratic Realism: An American Foreign Policyfor a A Unipolar World, The 2004 Irving Kristol
Lecture, the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC. 'The unipolar moment has be-
come the unipolar era', said Krauthammer in the years 1990-1991. This view was shared by
intellectuals who had gathered round the journal The National Interest, people such as Irving
Kristol, Bill Kristol, Samuel Huntington, Paul Wolfowitz, Norrnan Podhoretz and Daniel Pipes.
72 As a substantial proportion of the commentaries indicate. See, for example: Charney,
Jonathan, 'The Use ofForce against Terrorism and International Law', in The American Jour-
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But that is not the conviction of the Bush administration. As presented in
September 2002, the plan has a fifth pillar. The Bush administration infers a
fifth point from the preceding four points, namely that the United States
must defend itself: 'To defeat this threat, we must make use of every tool in
our arsenal - military power, better homeland defences, law enforcement,
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. ,73
The passages in which the Bush administration indicates that it wants to
confront the dangers differently from in the past are undoubtedly the most
important part of the document. It does not want to wait passively until di-
saster strikes but to intervene before the danger has fully materialized:
'America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully
formed. ,74 And another passage reads: 'Nations that enjoy freedom must
actively fight terror. ,75 The word 'prevention' is used regularly in the plan.
The United States of America will 'prevent our enemies from threatening
US,.76
The policy memorandum also invokes the notion of 'self-defence'. It is
noted that the US will do everything possible to maintain alliances with oth-
ers, but if this is not successful, it will have to act alone. 'While the United
States will constantly strive to enlist the support ofthe international commu-
nity, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of
self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country. ,77 And a little later we
find the following passage: 'To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.'78
It justifies this new approach by claiming that the traditional concepts of
deterrence will not work in the new situation. 'Traditional concepts ofdeter-
rence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wan-
ton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek
martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. ,79
nal of International Law, Vo!. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 835-839. This was criticised by
Franck, Thomas, 'Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense', in The American Journal ofIn-
ternational Law, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 839-843.
73 The National Security Strategy ofthe United States ofAmerica. introduction.
74 Ibid., introduction.
75 Idem.
76 Ibid., p. 1.
77 Ibid., p. 6.
78 Ibid., p. 15.
79 Idem.
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The last passage quoted above allows us to catch a glimpse of the nature
ofthe terrorist danger that the US fears: it concerns a kind ofterrorism whose
'soldiers' seek martyrdom. This is the only reference to the nature of the
terrorist danger. It concerns religious terrorism and - it is safe to assume -
primarily the terrorism that is created by Islamic groups and persons. The
Bush administration is deliberately very cautious, however, in referring to
the religious background ofthe threat. The latter finds expression only in the
reference to 'martyrs'.
9. CRITICISM AND THE NEW POLICY IN THE USA
The new defence policy of the US has aroused a storm ofcriticism. Accord-
ing to Ionathan Charney, the new US policy is disastrous.8o Actions in self-
defence under Article 51 of the Charter, uses of force against the territorial
integritY'·or political independence of another state, must be authorized by
the Security Council under Chapter VII. Article 2(4) prohibits both the con-
duct ofajust war and forceful reprisals.8I The use of force in self-defence is
limited to situations where the state is truly required to defend itself from
serious attack. 'In such situations, the state must carry the burden ofpresent-
ing evidence to support its actions, normally before these irreversible and
irreparable measures are taken. The United States should have disclosed the
factual bases for its claim of self-defence against the terrorist attacks before
engaging in military action. ,82 Over the long term, the interests ofthe United
States and the international community will be best served by the Charter-
based system ofworld order. 'Ifinternational terrorists have a coherent goal,
it is to undermine this system - an objective the United States is perhaps
unwittingly promoting by its actions. ,83
The French philosopher Tzvetan Todorov is another opponent of this
American defence policy. Todorov believes that the policy is guided by an
entirely new view on humans and society. According to this view, there are
no limits to the extent to which government action can transform society.
This is also called neo-conservatism, but, in Todorov's opinion, this is not
80 Charney, see above, fn. 72, pp. 835-839.
81 Ibid., p. 835.
82 Ibid., p. 836.
83 Ibid., p. 838.
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quite correct. It could also be called 'neo-fundamentalism'. The architects of
the new security policy are 'fundamentalists', as they use the concept of
Absolute Goodness as a guideline they wish to prescribe to everyone in a
binding manner. It is called 'neo', because it is not dictated by God but by the
values of liberal democracy. 'Les fondamentalistes croient aux valeurs
absolues, ifs rejettent donc le relativisme ambiant, les excuses donnees aux
entorses de la democratie par les multiculturalistes, la langue de bois du
politiquement correct'.'84 The idea that government action can transform
society is predominant. That is why it is hardly surprising that most neo-
conservatives used to be Trotskyists or Maoists.85
This is not the strongest part ofTodorov's criticism, however, because the
neo-conservatives would, perhaps, not deny that they still believe in the idea
that government action can transform society.
An interesting point in Todorov's criticism of the American intervention
in Iraq and other areas is that a democracy should never impose its values on
others. Todorov puts it as follows: 'Dans une democratie, il n 'a pas le droit
d'imposer son propre mode de vie aux autres par la force. ,86 Anyone who
does do so is called a 'fundamentalist'.
This is, of course, a rather tendentious representation of the facts. As if it
concerned the imposition of a 'mode de vie'. Legitimisation of military in-
tervention may be based on humanitarian considerations (in other countries
fundamental rights are violated on such an enormous scale that it would be
irresponsible to stand by and watch)87 and considerations of self-defence (to
which we will confine ourselves in this Chapter). Naturally, it is never about
imposing another way of life!
A second issue concerns Todorov's suggestion that a democracy should
never be allowed to impose its values byforce. This would mean that democ-
84 Todorov, Tzvetan, Le NOllveall Desordre mondial. Reflexions d'un Europeen, Preface
de Stanley Hoffrnann, Robert Laffont, Paris 2003, p. 36. Todorov's view bears some resem-
blance to the view ofthose who believe that both the United States ofAmerica and its funda-
mentalist opponents in the Middle East are guided by a form offundamentalism. This view is
expressed by Ali, Tariq, The Clash ofFllndamentalisms. Crusades, Jihads and Modernity,
Verso, London and New York 2002, and Sim, Stuart, Fundamentalist World. The New Dark
Age of Dogma, Icon Books UK, Totem Books USA 2004.
85 Todorov, see above, fn. 84, p. 36.
86 Ibid., p. 39.
87 On this subject, see Cushman, Thomas, ed., A Matter ofPrinciple. Humanitarian Argu-
ments for War in Iraq, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2005.
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racies should, by the nature ofthings, be pacifist. This is a far-reaching claim,
which raises the question whether Todorov confuses the internalfunctioning
of democracy with the question whether democracy may be created through
military intervention. It is true that a democracy is characterized by the fact
that political elites succeed each other without the use offorce. But this does
not mean that democracies have to be pacifist in their relations with the
outside world. Nor does it rule out that democracies may be established by
force. One may oppose such developments, but it is highly questionable
whether this opposition can be legitimized on the basis of any reflection on
the nature of the ideal of'democracy', as Todorov suggests.
Todorov thinks that democracy means that every people is sovereign and
that it has the right to defme itselfwhat it considers to be good. ('La democratie
signifie que chaquepeuple est souverain, qu 'il a donc aussi le droit de definir
pour lui-meme le Bien, plutot que de se le voir imposer du dehors. ') But here
Todorov ,~s mistaken in the sense that a specific people's decisions command
respect only ifthis people reaches a decision through a democratic process.
In other words: a people must first achieve a democracy before it earns re-
spect for its own choices.
If we take this argument to its logical conclusion, this naturally leads to
the position that only democracies should not have to fear interventions by
foreign states, whereas dictators can be overthrown with impunity by pow-
ers that are democracies themselves. Is this correct?
This may be morally correct, even though it is arguably undesirable from
a pragmatic perspective, because it puts the world's security at too much
risk.
This latter consideration seems to be decisive in Francis Fukuyama's criti-
cism ofthe Bush administration. As a matter offact, Fukuyama's analysis of
the state of the world resembles that of the neo-conservatives (to which he
belongs, according to some people) and that of the Bush administration in
many respects. Nevertheless, he makes some critical comments on the new
defence policy of the United States in the light of the great ambitions that
may not be achieved.88 Fukuyama also criticizes the Americans' 'voluntar-
ism': the optimistic idea that it is possible to establish democracies every-
where, independently of tradition and context. And like Todorov, Fukuyama
considers the neo-conservatives to be the architects of the new policy. For
88 Fukuyama, Francis, 'The Neoconservative Moment', in National Interest, July I, 2004.
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example, Fulcuyama comments on Charles Krauthammer's opinion onAmeri-
can unipolarity.89
His criticism is, however, mainly based on his assessment that the United
States ofAmerica overestimates its power. Ifconsidered in terms ofthe vari-
ous pillars of the American strategy plan of 2002, one may well argue that
Fulcuyama agrees with the first pillar (the defeat ofcommunism), the second
pillar (rejection of cultural relativism), the fourth pillar (the world has not
become a safer place), but that he questions the third pillar (American su-
premacy) and fifth pillar (we must defend ourselves militarily).
As we have seen above, Fukuyama's diagnosis is poor where it concerns
the analysis of the causes of the current threats posed to social cohesion in
Western states. Political Islam constitutes this threat. This political Islam
cannot yet organise traditional armies, as the Soviet Union could, but it is
widely supported in 'weak states' and it appeals to the rootless in the Western
world.
The problem that seems to occur in this context is that Western multicultural
states now have a population ofwhich a proportion trust the traditional insti-
tutions that have taken shape since the 17th and 18th centuries and that can be
referred to briefly as: democracy, state under the rule of law, and human
rights (which are ultimately defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948). On the other hand, a proportion ofthe population feels alien-
ated from society and seeks refuge in a form ofradical religiosity, in particu-
lar, that of radical Islam. Roger Scruton defines it as follows: 'Western
civilisation has left behind its religious belief and its sacred text, to place its
trust not in religious certainties but in open discussion, trial and error, and
the ubiquitousness of doubt. ,90 A considerable group of radical Islamists,
however, experience this rational discussion, this trial and error and the 'ubiq-
uitousness ofdoubt' as an enormous attack on their faith, against which they
may defend themselves, in their opinion, by using all means, even violent
ones, with a plea based on the right of self-defence.
89 Other books and articles in which the neo-conservative view is clearly expressed in-
clude Frum, David, & Perle, Richard, An End to Evil. How to Win the War on Terror, Ballantine
Books, New York 2003; 'Part n, Neoconservatives and Foreign Policy with Some Comments
by Friendly Dissenters', in: Stelzer, Irwin, ed., Neoconservatism, Atlantic Books, London
2004, pp. 53-141; and for the older neo-conservatism: 'Security and Freedom: Making the
World Safe with Ronald Reagan', in Gerson, Mark, ed., The Essential Neoconservative Reade/;
Addison-Wes1y Publishing Company, Inc., Reading Massachusetts 1996, pp. 161-207.
90 Scruton, The West and the Rest, p. xi.
SELF-DEFENCE AND TERRORISM 95
Scruton defines the dilemma very clearly when he writes: 'Territorial ju-
risdictions sit uneasily upon credal communities, which tend to recognize
the validity ofno law other than the divine command that shapes their iden-
tity. ,91 This is ofgreat significance to Islam. 'For the true Muslim, no law is
validated merely by deriving it from the customary law or sovereign edicts
that establish a territorial jurisdiction. Laws can warrant our obedience only
if they are divinely sanctioned; this means that their validity is established
only if they can be derived from the shari 'a - the revealed will of God.'92
Naturally, this does not apply to all Muslims. Islam, too, includes secular-
ized and modernized groups. Nevertheless, Gellner and Lewis rightly state
that it seems that, of the three monotheistic religions, Islam is the most im-
mune to secularisation.93 It is hard to reconcile the idea ofterritorialjurisdic~
tion with the political culture that is predominant in Muslim countries. These
countries have tried to achieve a kind of loyalty to territorial jurisdiction
with the philosophy ofArabic nationalism. The territorially defined nation
(qawm) was supposed to replace the Islamic umma as the 'focus ofloyalty' .94
According to Scruton, we have to do everything possible for this reason to
revitalise specific ideas that may otherwise be lost: 'territorial concepts of
sovereignty oflaw, and secular ideas of citizenship' .95 Ifwe do not succeed,
we will be faced with a period of chaos, both in a national and in an interna-
tional context.
10. NEUTRAL GROUND
It is argued here that it is Scruton who has written the most sensible things
about this subject. His suggestions deserve to be translated into concrete
policy, but how could this be done? It would seem that it could be achieved
only ifcitizenship were based on a neutral footing, meaning: independent of
religious affiliation. However, there is little enthusiasm for this kind of citi-
91 Ibid., p. 25.
92 Ibid., p. 26.
93 Nevertheless, the other theistic religions have radical forms as well. On this subject,
see Fourest, Caroline, & Venner, Fiametta, Tirs Croises. La lai'cite al 'epreuve des integrismes
juif, chretien et musulman, Calmann-Levy, Paris 2003 en Ruthven, Malise, Fundamentalism.
The Search for Meaning, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
94 Scruton, see above, fn. 90, p. 32.
95 Ibid., p. 46.
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zenship because of the influence of postmodemism and multiculturalism.96
This applies not only to the Islamic world, but also to the United States of
America. For example, the present Bush administration has wandered from
the original ideal ofthe American founding fathers, who, in Jefferson's memo-
rable words, envisaged a 'Wall of Separation': a separation between church
and state.97 On various occasions, the American President expresses his own
religious conviction. In doing so, he creates the impression in the Islamic
world that there is a clash between Christianity and Islam. Every criticism
and certainly every military intervention is then perceived as religiously
motivated: the crusaders that want to conquer (or liberate) the Holy Land.
Susan Jacoby, author ofa book in the American secularist tradition, writes
how President George W. Bush presided over an ecumenical prayer service
in Washington's National Cathedral. 'Delivering an address indistinguish-
able from a sermon, replacing the language of civic virtue with the language
of faith, the nation's chief executive might as well have been the Reverend
Bush. ,98
From the perspective of an unbeliever and someone with another religion
than the president, this is not the kind of language that fosters social cohe-
sion within a pluralist community. Bush felt free to ignore Americans who
do not adhere to any religious faith, whose outlook is predominantly secular,
and who interpret history as the work of man rather than God. The Jewish-
American lawyer Alan Dershowitz, one of Bush's vehement critics in this
field, has this to say about it: 'The very first act of the new Bush administra-
tion was to have a Protestant Evangelist minister officially dedicate the inau-
guration to Jesus Christ, whom he declared to be 'our Savior.' InvoIcing 'the
Father, the Son, the Lord Jesus Christ' and 'the Holy Spirit,' Billy Graham's
son, the man selected by President George W. Bush to bless his presidency,
excluded the tens of millions of Americans who are Muslims, Jews, Bud-
dhists, Shintoists, Unitarians, agnostics, and atheists from his blessing by his
particularistic and parochial language. ,99
96 For an analysis of these concepts, see Gellner, Emest, Postmodernism, Reason, and
Religion, Routledge, London and New York 1992.
97 On this topic, see Howse, Brannon, One Nation under Man? The worldview war be-
tween Christians and the Secular Left, Broadman & Holman Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee
2005.
98 Jacoby, Susan, Freethinkers. A History ofAmerican Secularism, Henry Holt and Com-
pany, New York 2004, p. 2.
99 Dershowitz, Alan, 'Bush Starts Offby Defying the Constitution', in Los Angeles Times~
January 24, 2001; Dershowitz, Alan, Shouting Fire. Civil Liberties in a turbulent Age, Little,
Brown and Company, Boston / New York / London 2002, p. 201.
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The plain message conveyed by the new administration was that George
W. Bush's America was a Christian nation. Non-Christians were welcome in
the tent so long as they agreed to accept their status as a tolerated minority
rather than as fully equal citizens, Dershowitz wrote.
Another critic ofBush in this regard is the philosopher Peter Singer. Singer
formulates the problem with this confusion ofevangelizing and politics thus:
'The Islamic militant who believes he is doing the will of God when he flies
a plane full of passengers into the World Trade Center is just as much a
person of faith as the Christian who believes she is doing the will of God
when she spends her days picketing a clinic that offers abortions.' 100 Also
the philosopher Sam Harris explains why all this 'God-tall<' does not help us
in the struggle with international terrorism. Harris's diagnosis is alanning.
There seems to be a problem with some of our most cherished beliefs about
the world, he tells us. 'They are leading us, inexorably, to ldll one another. A
glance at history, or at the pages of any newspaper, reveals that ideas which
divide one group ofhuman beings from another, only to unite them in slaughter
generally have their roots in religion.' 101 According to Hams, it seems that if
our species ever eradicates itself through war, it will not be because it was
written in the stars but because it was written in our books: 'It is what we do
with words like 'God' and 'paradise' and 'sin' in the present that will deter-
mine our future.'102 A nuclear war between India and Paldstan seems 'al-
most inevitable, given what most Indians and Paldstanis believe about the
afterlife.'103 Many people say that 'extremists' should be taken to task only
for what they do. Harris does not think so. He contends it is important to
specify the dimension in which some terrorists are deemed to be extreme.
They are extreme in their faith. 'They are extreme in their devotion to the
literal word of the Koran and the hadith (...) and this leads them to be ex-
treme in the degree to which they believe that modernity and secular culture
are incompatible with moral and spiritual health.' 104 Certain beliefs are in-
trinsically dangerous. 105 We are killing ourselves over ancient literature. 106
100 Singer, Peter, The President ofGoodandEvil. Taking George W. Bush seriously, Granta
Books, London 2004, p. 104.
101 Harris, The End ofFaith, see above, fn. 9, p. 12.
102 Ibid., p. 12.
103 Ibid., p. 27.
104 Ibid., p. 29.
105 Ibid., p. 44.
106 Ibid., p. 73.
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Some people say that radicals put a wrong interpretation on the sacred
texts. This may be true, but does that help us? Does it help us to say that
people 'misuse' their religion? According to the Pope, Luther 'misused' his
religion. According to Luther, the Pope 'misused' his religion. According to
Sayyid Qutb, the source of inspiration for Osama Bin Laden and other reli-
gious terrorists, liberal Muslims 'misuse' their religion. According to liberal
Muslims, Qutb 'misuses' their religion. IO?
We do not have to hold a theological debate here,108 but an axiomatic
contention that every reference to violence cannot be sincerely 'religious' is
premature and not very fruitfuL We have to deal with the social reality of
religion, and this social reality confronts us with radical interpretations that
do not shun violence. It is contended that James Gow is right when he writes:
'One ofthe biggest challenges to stability for the West concerns social cohe-
sion. The impact of violent Islamist action in one Western state, above all
within the EU, would have undoubted impact on others, including the pros-
pect offurther terrorist activity. One point ofthis, from the perspective ofthe
Islamist terrorist, would be to mobilize support among co-religionists, no
matter what their ethnic, cultural or political background otherwise, and to
foster international tensions.' 109
What can be done to avoid the Clash of Civilizations? One thing is clear:
silencing those who point out the problems is not a solution. When Hunting-
ton presented his thesis, commentators warned the public against this 'dan-
gerous idea'. They assumed that Huntington proposed that we should allow
civilisations to clash. As if the American political analyst wanted a clash or
took the risk that a clash of this kind might occur by using such misleading
statements. But, of course, Huntington was not proposing anything of that
sort; he was describing what he saw that had happened in the social world.
107 On Qutb, Ibn Taymiyya and other ideological sources of contemporary religious ter-
rorism, see Esposito, John, Unholy Ww: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University
Press, New York 2002, pp. 30-31; Jansen, Johannes, The Dual Nature ofIslamic Fundamen-
talism. Comell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1997, pp. 47-54.
108 See Krauthammer, Charles, 'Violence and Islam', in The Washington Post. December
6, 2002, who, when asked the question 'is Islam an inherently violent religion?' answers:
'The question is not just unanswerable, it is irrelevant'. What counts are the 'actions ofactual
Muslims in the world today'. And then we cannot deny that 'some of the worst, most hate-
driven violence in the world today is perpetrated by Muslims and in the name of Islam.'
109 Gow, James, Defending the West. Polity Press, Maiden / Cambridge 2005, p. 12.
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And in this respect his essay was prophetic, in the same way that Fukuyama's
essay was prophetic, at least in part, in 1989.
So what can be done?
11. A SECULAR STATE IDENTITY BASED ON SHARED VALUES
The fIrst solution (or direction of a solution) would be to foster loyalty to a
state that can been seen as a neutral arbiter in the eyes of all citizens. That
means that all attempts to place the focus ofpolitical loyalty on a religiously
oriented state or on sacred law, are futile. European countries have to make a
tremendous effort to integrate their religious minorities. A necessary feature
of the integration process is to relinquish the idea that the primary focus of
loyalty should be on the heavenly state and that holy law has priority over
secular law.
Todorov clearly defInes the values that should play a vital role. He men-
tions six core values.
Rationality. In this context, rationality does not mean that Europeans always
act rationally, but that they assume that the world can be understood by ratio-
nal means. Even the most curious and mysterious deeds can be understood
by the power ofreason. llo This assumption also forms the basis for Western
science.
Justice. Private acts are based on the idea ofjustice.
Democracy. A third value Todorov presents as being constitutive of the Eu-
ropean tradition is democracy. He calls it an invention of the Greeks. It is
true that all kinds ofgroups were excluded inAncient Greece: women, slaves,
aliens. But this does not alter the fact that they expressed an idea.
Individualfreedom. Protagoras' statement that man is the measure ofall things
indicates that man is central in this mode of thinking. And this is positive. It
will eventually result in a greater degree of freedom. III
Lai"cite. It is remarkable that Todorov presents lalcite as part of an explicitly
European heritage. He refers to its Christian roots. It is based on a saying of
110 Todorov, see above, fn. 84, p. 120.
III Ibid., p. 126.
100 PAUL CLITEUR
Jesus in Matthew 22:21 that we should give to the emperor the things that are
the emperor's, and to God the things that are God's. One can also refer to a
saying ofJesus in John (18:36) that his kingdom is not ofthis world. This is
the reason why, in the Christian tradition, there is a contrast between heaven
and earth, between the theological and the political. 'La laicite designe, non
I'absence ou le rejet du religieux mais cette separation meme, et donc le
refur d'imposer les valeurs chrbiennes par le glaive.'
In contradistinction to a regime that recognizes la'icite, Todorov uses the
term 'ideocracy'. This is a collective name for theocracy and totalitarian-
ism.1I2
Tolerance. Todorov refers to tolerance as a sixth value.
The Return ofBritishness
It will also be necessary to foster a sense of solidarity with the nation-state
people live in. It seems that the United Kingdom, the most multicultural
country in the West,113 is reconsidering the double loyalties of multi-
culturalism. On 14 January 2006, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, then Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, made a speech at the Fabian New Year Conference
in London. He asked the following question: 'Should we do more to define a
positive sense ofBritishness?' 114 And his answer was: yes.
Once again, it had been terrorist acts that had given the British - like the
Americans - food for thought. Since 7 July 2005, the balance between diver-
sity and integration had to be reconsidered. According to Brown, you had to
have a clear view ofwhat being British meant, what you valued about being
British and what gave the British purpose as a nation. Brown argued that
British values demanded a new constitutional settlement and renewed civic
patriotism.
Brown also gave a warning. When people were insecure, he said, there
was always a risk that they would retreat into more exclusive identities rooted
in 19th-century conception ofblood, race and territory. What people tended to
forget was that they should celebrate a British identity which was bigger
112 Ibid., p. 130.
113 On this subject, see Thomas, Dominique, Le Londonistan. Le djihad au Coeur de
I'Europe, Editions Michalon, 2005.
114 Speech by the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, Chancellor ofthe Exchequer, at the Fabian
New Year Conference, London, 14/0112006.
SELF-DEFENCE AND TERRORISM 101
than the sum of its parts and that a union was strong because of its shared
values. Race and ethnicity were no basis for a common British identity. Al-
though the British response to the events of7 July had been magnificent,
they had to face the uncomfortable facts that there were British citizens,
British born, apparently integrated into the British community, who were
prepared to 'maim and kill fellow British citizens, irrespective of their reli-
gion.' That meant that the British had to be 'far more ambitious in defining
for our time the responsibilities of citizenship'. If they did not promote
Britishness, they ran a real risk ofhaving a divided society. 'And this British
patriotism is, in my view, founded not on ethnicity nor race, not just on insti-
tutions we share and respect, but on enduring ideals which shape our view of
ourselves and our communities - values which in turn influence the way our
institutions evolve.'
What then are these values that Brown defines? He summarizes these as
follows: 'Liberty for all, responsibility by all and fairness to all.'
These' are important values. But are they specifically British? Perhaps
that is only partly the case. Brown carried it off by pointing out that even
before America had made these values its own, Britain could lay claim to the
idea of liberty. 'Out of the necessity of finding a way to live together in a
multicultural state came the practice of toleration and then the pursuit of
liberty.'
It can be argued that Brown confuses historical genesis with the claim to
validity. It may be true that the British were the first to discover the idea of
political liberty in the Western world and include such an idea in their consti-
tution. Voltaire was right when he indicated that Britain had given to the
world the idea ofliberty. But the question ofwhich nation has discovered an
idea is less important than the question ofits universal validity. And it cannot
be denied that the value ofpolitical liberty has universal appeal. This is the
true core of the American defence plan. The idea ofa 'government account-
able to the people' was also first developed in the United Kingdom, but is in
fact a universal idea.
* * *
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The general expectation was that the world we
live in would be characterized by great ideological consensus. This expecta-
tion turned out to be unrealistic. It is correct to state that the primary focus of
political loyalty isno longer ideological, as Fukuyama has argued. This should
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be a hopeful sign, but unfortunately, ideology has been replaced by some-
thing else that continues to divide people: religion. Western states have
multicultural populations and a proportion of these populations is loyal pri-
marily to religion. This does not apply to all members of religious minori-
ties, but is applies to some of them.
Moreover, members ofreligious minorities feel out oftouch with Western
society and its standards. One ofthese standards is a far-reaching freedom of
speech on religious matters. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that
European states have their roots in religious criticism.115 This means that it
is hardly conceivable to consider any concessions in this standard for the
sake of pacifying radical Muslims. At the same time, members of religious
minorities regard this religious criticism as a violation of the integrity of
their world view and as senseless mockery ofall that is sacred to them. They
defend themselves against it by various means, including violence. Part of
international religious terrorism is a response to views and opinions expressed
by Western authors. The United Kingdom was the fIrst Western country to be
confronted with this international religious terrorism, at the time ofthe fatwa
against Rushdie. In 2004, the Netherlands followed with the murder ofTheo
van Gogh. This confronts Western countries with a very specific form of
religious terrorism, which countries in the Middle East have been dealing
with for a longer time (Farag Foda).
Another source of tension concerns the universalist efforts of the United
States and other Western states to export Western or universal values to parts
of the world referred to as 'failed states' or 'rogue states'. This ambition is
justified partly by invoking the universality of the values at issue, partly by
invoking self-defence.
It is of cmcial importance to world peace and social cohesion within the
states ofthe world community that these tensions are relieved. This necessi-
tates consensus about a new constitutional order, which should be neutral
and - consequently - secular. The idea of territorial jurisdiction will have to
be strengthened and accompanied by a new kind offocus on citizenship and
even patriotism.
115 On the value of the freedom of religion, see Jellinek, George, Die ErklCirung der
Menschen- undBiirgerrechte, Vierte Auflage, in DritterAuflage bearbeitet von WaIter Jellinek,
Duncker & Humblot, Miinchen und Leipzig 1927.
